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Abstract
Researchers have mentioned that the three most difficult and growing problems in the
future of high-performance computing will be avoiding, coping and recovering from failures.
As the scale of computing increases, the Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) of the entire
system decreases and, therefore, system resilience and fault tolerance techniques become
mandatory. One of the most commonly used fault tolerance schemes is checkpoint/restart,
however, it has been predicted that the current checkpoint/restart approach is not scalable.
Thus, current research seeks to find scalable fault tolerance techniques as well as to extend
the scalability of checkpoint/restart.
The periodicity of the checkpointing operation, otherwise known as the checkpoint
interval, plays an important role in application execution time and I/O performance. It can
have a significant impact on execution time and the number of checkpoint I/O operations
performed by the application. The frequency of checkpoint I/O operations performed
by the application, along with its productive I/O, determine the demand made by the
application on the I/O bandwidth of a massively parallel processing (MPP) system. There
are analytical models for finding the optimal checkpoint interval that minimizes wall-clock
execution time and the optimal checkpoint interval that minimizes the number of checkpoint
I/O operations generated.
This thesis presents a study that quantitatively measures the effect of the checkpoint interval on workload execution time and the number of checkpoint I/O operations generated.
The study is based on the execution behavior of RAxML 7.2.6, a popular community code,
and RAxML-Light 1.0.6 on an HPC system as well as simulations of workloads executed on
an HPC system. Parameter values for the HPC runs and the simulations are the product
of analysis of historic failure data of 22 systems made available by the Computer Failure
Data Repository (CFDR). This analysis also is presented in the thesis.
Our research showed that increasing the checkpoint interval to a value above the optimal
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checkpoint interval with respect to the execution time results in a significant decrease in
the number of checkpoint I/O operations with a marginal increase in execution time. This
shows that the associated analytical model holds good for the cases studied.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Going to the Exascale” is the latest challenging endeavor towards which a substantial
body of research in high performance computing is directed. Exascale computing means
millions of processors working together in tandem. As described in a recent report [58],
Exascale computing will require a radical change in every aspect of computer organization,
architecture and design. It also will require transformations in application programming
models, compilers, algorithms and application codes. In addition to challenges in hardware,
power consumption, and memory organization/usage, one of the biggest challenges in this
path towards Exascale is predicted to be in the area of system resilience [28]. Researchers
have mentioned that the three most difficult and growing problems in the future will be
avoiding, coping and recovering from failures. As the scale of computing increases, the Mean
Time to Failure (MTTF) of the entire system decreases and, therefore, system resilience
and fault tolerance techniques become mandatory.
Currently, one of the commonly used fault tolerance schemes is checkpoint/restart [28],
[58], [24]. In the checkpoint/restart scheme, the global state of an application is periodically written as a checkpoint file to persistent storage, like disks, to allow restoration of
state in the case of a failure. In the event of a failure, the checkpoint/restart scheme enables the application to restore its state to one prior to the failure, using information from
the latest stored checkpoint file. Checkpoint/restart can be either application driven or
system driven. In application-driven checkpoint/restart, the application decides when to
perform the checkpoint write, while in system-driven checkpoint/restart, the system periodically stores the state of all active applications to disks. Another classification of the
checkpoint/restart strategy is coordinated and non-coordinated checkpoint using message
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logging [24]. In coordinated checkpointing, all processes performing a checkpoint coordinate to store a stable global state to disk storage. Since there is no global clock in MPP
systems, capturing the state of different processes running on different nodes is difficult.
Thus, processes communicate and synchronize among themselves to store their local states
and the state of their interactions within the network. In case of a failure, all processes
need to be restarted. In a non-coordinated checkpoint strategy using message logging, the
individual processes store their network states as messages to the server. They perform a
checkpoint individually. It is assumed that process execution is piecewise deterministic [57],
i.e., it is governed by its message reception [36]. During a failure, only the failed processes
are restarted. Thus, a failed process is restored to its prior state and executes the same
computation as in its previous execution, which is based on messages stored on the stable
storage.
During traditional checkpointing, the entire state of the application is stored to a persistent storage, e.g., disk storage, periodically (periodic checkpoint system). In MPP systems,
the overhead of an I/O operation is enormous. The I/O disks are shared among multiple
nodes of the cluster and, therefore, an I/O operation contributes to network contention as
well. This overhead ultimately affects the execution time of the application and all active
concurrently-executing applications. Thus, a reduction in the number of I/O operations can
be expected to have a positive impact on the overall performance of a high-end computing
(HEC) system.
It is predicted that traditional checkpoint/restart approach is not scalable[15]. One of
the main reasons for non-scalability of checkpoint/restart techniques for large-scale systems
is the sheer volume of bursty checkpoint data that is required to be handled by the I/O
system. Accordingly, there is research being conducted that is related to building fault
resilient algorithms. But designing such approaches is a challenge due to the fact that
such fault tolerance is tightly coupled with the system itself. However, fault tolerance
mechanisms should be portable and not dependent on the systems on which they will
run. Some studies show that coordinated checkpointing is less scalable than the non-
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coordinated message logging checkpoint/restart strategy. There also is research related to
reducing checkpoint data size by performing incremental checkpoints [9]. This research
is not directed towards reducing checkpoint data sizes, but it can be used in conjunction
with techniques for reducing the size of checkpoint data, potentially resulting in further
improvement in checkpoint/restart efficiency by minimizing the stress on the I/O system.
Also, recent studies are geared towards using in-memory checkpoint [67], checkpointing to
solid state devices (SSDs) [47]. Although such research can lead to a better fault tolerance
scheme, this goal can be facilitated by the study of historic failure data, which can provide
information about failures, their types and origins.
The remainder of this chapter presents the motivation for doing the research discussed
in this thesis (Section 1.1), the common terminology used in this thesis (Section 1.2),
the problem description and a brief description of our solution (Section 1.3), a high-level
description of our experimental methodology (Section 1.4), and a list of the contributions
of this thesis as well as the organization of the remainder of the thesis (Section 1.5).

1.1

Motivation

Parallel applications can benefit from high-performance computational capabilities of Petascale systems. However, I/O performance is the greatest slowdown factor of Petascale applications and, therefore, the main performance bottleneck arises from I/O latency [18]. The
rate of growth of disk-drive performance, both in terms of the number of I/O operations per
second and sustained bandwidth, is smaller than the rate of growth of the performance of
other memory components in computing systems [59]. As shown in Figure 1.1, disk access
is slower than SRAM and DRAM access by several orders of magnitude. As a result, a
reduction in the number of I/O operations is expected to have a positive impact on the
overall performance of MPP systems.
For HPC applications I/O operations can be classified into two broad categories: productive I/O and defensive I/O. I/O operations that are inherent to the application are
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Figure 1.1: Memory Access Times in CPU Cycles
called productive I/O operations. Productive I/O operations are mandatory and are used
during various processes like visualization, rendering, etc. Defensive I/O operations are
optional and generally related to fault tolerance methods like checkpoint I/O.
For large applications, it is observed that about 75% of the overall I/O is defensive [3].
Studies show that when HPC applications run with higher process counts, i.e., on multiple
nodes, their checkpoint frequencies and checkpoint file sizes increase [39]. Another feature
of checkpoint I/O is that it occurs in bursts [23], [35], [45], [42]. Thus, frequent checkpoint
writes will affect the network contention of the system. Accordingly, a systematic effort
to reduce the number of checkpoint IO operations is required. Although, there is an
ongoing debate about whether or not the checkpoint/restart technique will be used for
fault tolerance in Exascale systems, until now there has been no stable fault tolerance

4

technique that can replace checkpoint/restart completely. This study focuses on reducing
the number of checkpoint I/O operations in tandem with other methods that can increase
the scalability of checkpoint/restart.

1.2

Terminology

While discussing the checkpoint/restart strategy, which is also referred to as the rollback/recovery strategy, certain terms are commonly used; they are presented below.
• Checkpoint latency: The amount of time required to write the checkpoint file to
persistent storage, like disk storage.
• Checkpoint interval: The application execution time between two consecutive
checkpoint operations.
• Checkpoint overhead: The increase in the execution time of an application due to
checkpointing.
• Solution time (of an application): The time taken by the application to complete
execution without any failures or fault tolerance measures.
Figure 1.2 gives a pictorial representation of these terms.

1.3

Problem Definition

The periodicity of the checkpointing operation, otherwise known as the checkpoint interval,
plays an important role in the execution time and I/O performance of the application.
Consider an application having a total solution time of x hours (without any defensive
I/O operations). The total time taken to complete application execution in a failure-free
environment with no other concurrently-executing applications primarily depends on two
factors:
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Figure 1.2: Checkpoint Latency, Interval and Overhead as well as Solution Time
• I/O latency to write a checkpoint file and
• the number of checkpoint writes.
A recent report [15] states that for Top500 machines the average time to perform a
checkpoint of the entire system (alias checkpoint latency) varies from 20 to 30 minutes. The
checkpoint latency is dependent on the size of the checkpoint file, system characteristics and
the other applications running in parallel and contending for resources such as the network
and I/O subsystem. The checkpoint interval is the only parameter in an application-driven
periodic-checkpointing system that can be modified by an application developer to yield
different results in terms of the number of I/O operations and total wall clock execution
time. However, to do this, the application developer needs to understand the relationship of
the application execution time and the number of I/O operations to the checkpoint interval
this is a challenging task.
Research Objective: To enhance the understanding of the behavior of real HPC
applications in terms of their execution times and the number of I/O operations they
generate as a function of their checkpoint intervals, we have used information from existing
analytical models and historic failure data. The two analytical models considered in our
study are briefly presented in the following subsections.
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1.3.1

Analytical Model for Wall Clock Execution Time

John Daly [19],[20],[21] presented a model to estimate the optimal checkpoint interval for
systems that follow a Poisson failure distribution. Daly showed that the execution time of
an application can be defined as:
R

T = M e M (e

(τ +δ)
M

− 1) Tτs

His hypothesis showed that the optimal checkpoint interval, τg
opt , which would result in
minimum execution time, can be defined as:

τg
opt =









√



1 δ
2δM 1 +
3 2M

!1

2

!

1 δ 
+
−δ
9 2M

M

for δ < 2M

(1.1a)

for δ ≥ 2M

(1.1b)

where,
Ts = Solution time (time taken by an application to complete computation without any
failures and fault tolerant measures),
τ = Checkpoint interval (time elapsed between each checkpoint file write),
δ = Checkpoint latency (time taken to write a checkpoint file to persistent storage),
R = Restart time (time taken to recover from any failure), and
M = Mean Time to Interrupt (MTTI) an application (MTTI refers to the mean time
between application interruptions. The mean time between failures or the time between
occurence of two failures in a system, is defined as a sum of the mean time to repair
(MTTR) and mean time to interrupt (MTTI). The MTTI is used in to replace mean time
to failures (MTTF) for practical cases [15]).

Accordingly, he showed that the optimal checkpoint interval does not depend on the
applications solution time but, rather, on the latency of the checkpoint operation and
the MTTI of the system. The latency to write a checkpoint file depends on the amount
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of data written during a checkpoint (size of the checkpoint file) and on the state of the
network. For applications where the size of the checkpoint file changes over time, the
optimal checkpoint interval will change dynamically. Also for applications with similar
amounts of checkpoint data, the checkpoint interval will be similar. Mathematically this
optimal checkpoint interval will provide minimum execution time.

1.3.2

Analytical Model for Number of I/O Operations

S. Arunagiri, et al presented an analytical model, based on Daly’s execution time model,
for the number of defensive I/O operations [12]. In the paper, the authors show that,
similar to Daly’s Execution time model, the number of I/O operations is also a function of
checkpoint interval, checkpoint latency, MTTI, solution time and restart time.
NI/O =

Ts
τ

h

R



1 + eM e

δ+τ
M

i

−1

The checkpoint interval that leads to the minimum number of defensive I/O operations,
the optimal checkpoint interval with respect to the number of I/O operations is:
h



τI/O = M 1 + P roductLog −e−

δ+M
M

+ e−

R+δ+M
M

i

where,
Ts = solution time, τ = checkpoint interval, δ = checkpoint latency, R = restart time, and
M = mean time to interrupt (MTTI) an application.
It has also been proven that τI/O >> τopt .
The authors present a simulation-based study to validate their model. They present
the plot depicted in Figure 1.3 to demonstrate that increasing the checkpoint interval has a
greater impact on reducing the number of I/O operations than on reducing execution time.
In this casestudy, they considered an application with Solution Time (Ts ) = 500 hours,
MTTI (M ) = 24 hours, Checkpoint latency (τ ) = 5 minutes and Restart Time (R) = 10
minutes. As shown in the figure, the blue line, shows the change in the execution time with
increasing checkpoint interval and the green line represents, the decrease in number of I/O
8

Figure 1.3: Optimal Checkpoint Interval given by Model of Execution Time vs. that given
by Model of Number of I/O Operations.
operations with increasing checkpoint interval. From the curve it is evident, that the rate
of decrease of number of I/O operations is higher than the rate of increase of execution
time with respect to the increase in checkpoint interval. Thus, a larger checkpoint interval
has a potential for a drastic decrease in the number of I/O operations accompanied by
some increase in execution time. This is the main motivation behin our research which
is directed towards studying the performance and significance of this model for real-life
applications. The main objectives of our research are:
• Study the variation of the execution time and the number of I/O operations as a
function of the checkpoint interval.
• Investigate patterns in historic failure data to provide information for realistic values
of expected node and system MTTI and for scheduling of checkpoints.
• Using historic failure data, conduct a simulation-based study of a selected HPC ap9

plication to determine the percentage error of the estimates of execution time and
number of I/O operations made by the two analytical models.
A secondary objective of this research is geared towards trying to predict the MTTI of
the system. In this regard, we plan to use the MTTI computed based on n years of historic
failure data, and determine the percentage error of the estimates of execution time and
number of I/O operations made by the two analytical models using that MTTI in their
computation.

1.4

High-level Description of Methodology

To study the variation of execution time and number of I/O operations as a function of
the checkpoint interval in a real HPC application, based on consultation with experts at
Texas Advanced Computing Center (TACC) [6], we selected RAxML, a popular community
code. RAxML (Randomized Axelerated Maximum Likelihood) [53] is an important HPC
application used for the phylogenetic study of evolutionary trees. This code has been used
as a part of the NSF iPlant Tree of Life (iPTOL) Project [7]. In 2009, RAxML was reported
to have around 6,000 source code downloads and over 40,000 job submissions to the two
web-servers. It uses DMTCP [11] for checkpoint support and only the PThreads version of
RAxML supports checkpointing. Since RAxML could not scale to more than one node, we
moved to the stripped-down version of RAxML called RAxML-Light v.1.0.6. RAxML-Light
can run on multiple nodes because it has support for MPI and is capable of performing
checkpointing. Through a computational resource time allocation award, the application
was executed on Ranger [8] at TACC with failures simulated based on the assumption of
Poisson component failure. For all experiments, checkpoint/restart data was gathered and
analyzed.
To investigate patterns in historic failure data, we analyzed failure records from 22
clusters at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) collected over a duration of 10 years
this data is available in the Computer Failure Data Repository (CFDR) [4]. Finally, the
10

checkpoint/restart parameters collected from running RAxML on TACC and historic failure
data were used in a simulation study to determine the percentage error of the two analytical
models.

1.5

Contributions of Thesis

The contributions of this thesis are:
• Using historic failure data, analysis of failure distribution and computation of expected node and system MTTI.
• Study of the variation of execution time and number of I/O operations as a function of
checkpoint interval. We also investigated the validity of the analytical models related
to periodic checkpoint/restart, i.e., the models for execution time [21] and number of
I/O operations [12].
This investigation was carried out in two stages:
1. Execution of RAxML and RAxML-Light on a real MPP system (Ranger) with failures
simulated assuming Poisson component failure, leading to a simulated exponential
failure distribution.
(a) To perform this study the RAxML and RAxML-Light applications were modified
to incorporate logging functions to log the start time, end time and amount of
data transfer, in bytes, for each checkpoint I/O operation.
(b) The codes were modified to read from an external failure file and simulate failure
and restart sequences after particular durations of time.
(c) The RAxML-Light code was further modified to perform periodic checkpointing
at regular intervals of time.
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2. Using latency parameters from experiments on Ranger and MTTI estimates from
analysis of the LANL failure data, a simulation study that is used to validate the
models.
The main focus of this thesis is reducing the number of defensive I/O operations of an
HPC application by modifying the checkpoint interval. The thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 presents background and related work; Chapter 3 describes the experimental
methodology used to conduct this research; Chapter 4 presents and discusses the experimental results; and Chapter 5 states the conclusions and discusses future work.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
2.1

Checkpoint/Restart Strategy

The research related to checkpoint/restart technique for fault tolerance is vast and there
is extensive literature available in this domain. The checkpoint/restart strategy can be
classified into three categories based on the style of operation used to implement the technique, namely independent checkpointing, coordinated checkpointing, and communicationinduced checkpointing [24]. In independent checkpointing [13], the processes perform checkpointing individually without communicating with other processes. The main issue with
this process is susceptibility to the domino effect. The domino effect is the process of repeatedly rolling-back process states (among multiple processes) until a consistent global state
is realized; one rollback may cause multiple rollbacks to realize a global state. Although
independent checkpointing has less synchronization overhead, coordinated checkpointing is
the more commonly used checkpoint/restart strategy. In coordinated checkpointing [17],
the parallel processes communicate with each other to save a system-wide consistent state.
In the event of a failure, after restart, this information, which is stored in persistent storage,
can be used to restore the state of the application without loss of consistency. The main
concern with coordinated checkpointing is its scalability due to synchronization overhead.
To address this, another checkpoint strategy has been proposed in the literature, which is
called communication-induced checkpointing [40], [14], [60]. It is both asynchronous and
independent, therefore, reducing communication overhead.
To achieve transparent checkpointing in computing clusters, coordinated checkpointing is the most commonly implemented checkpoint strategy. As mentioned above, in this

13

strategy all coordinating processors are synchronized to ensure consistent global state before checkpointing. Chandy, et al. present an algorithm that can be used to find the global
state of an application running on a distributed system [17]. The main concept for attaining
a global state is that each process must save its local state and communicate this action to
the master process via a message. However, the main drawback with coordinated checkpointing is scalability. Pattabiraman, et al., show an efficient way to model coordinated
checkpointing for large-scale systems [48]. They use the metric of useful work, i.e., computation that contributes to final job completion, for their performance evaluation. Thus,
computation lost due to a failure is not useful work. They also suggest that for modeling
useful work Stochastic Activity Networks (SANs) give better results than Markov models.
This model considers all conditions and overheads related to coordinated checkpointing
along with failure during checkpoint/restart.
One important question related to periodic checkpointing is how often a checkpoint
write operation should be performed. There is a body of research that addresses this
question and it presents models for determining the optimal checkpoint interval. One of
the initial models was proposed by Young [65]. In this model, the optimal checkpoint
interval is defined as a function of checkpoint latency/overhead (time to write a checkpoint
file to persistent storage) and Mean Time to Interrupt (MTTI) for the system. However,
this model assumes that no failure can occur during a checkpoint/restart operation as it
assumes the Mean Time between Failures (MTBF) of the system is large compared to the
checkpoint/restart time. However, this is not always true. Thus, in order to relax this
assumption, Daly [21] proposed a higher order estimate of the optimal checkpoint interval
based on [65]. This model considers the situation of a system failure occurring during
a checkpoint/restart operation. The main focus of this work is on finding an optimum
checkpoint/restart strategy that will minimize wall-clock execution time for applications
running on systems exhibiting the Poisson single-component failure distribution. Initially,
the paper presents a first-order model assumes that the optimal checkpoint interval may
depend on the restart time. However, the higher-order model, which was developed based
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on the first-order model, removes this dependency. It also presents a perturbation solution
of the higher-order function to provide an accurate approximation to the optimal checkpoint
interval. Note, however, that it does not model the overhead of coordinated checkpointing.
Subramaniyan, et al. illustrate another analytical model to determine optimal checkpoint frequency in terms of the MTBF of the system, the amount of memory checkpointed,
the sustainable I/O bandwidth of the system, and the frequency of checkpointing [59]. This
model studies a way to optimize I/O related to checkpoints.
Another important question related to this field of inquiry is whether checkpoints should
be periodic or not. In this regard, Ling, et al. proposed another optimal checkpoint
scheduling model based on the calculus of variation techniques [37]. The authors deduced
a relationship between the optimal checkpoint interval and the failure distribution of the
system. In their work they proposed that a periodic checkpoint strategy is optimal if the
system failure trends follow a Poisson/exponential process and a non-periodic checkpoint
scheme is optimal for systems not conforming to the Poisson failure distribution.
Jones, et al. present a study of sub-optimal checkpoint intervals in [33] based on [21].
They show that underestimating the optimal checkpoint interval has more adverse effects
on application efficiency than overestimating it.
Various studies have shown that a periodic coordinated checkpoint/restart strategy will
not scale effectively for Petascale and Exascale computing [15], [28]. There have been
various kinds of efforts to find a more suitable and scalable fault tolerance technique,
such as fault-tolerant algorithms [63], [27] and replication [29], self healing [26] and self
stabilization [51]. Also, there are studies on enhancing checkpoint I/O performance by
replacing disk-based checkpoints with in-memory checkpoints [67], staging I/O on data
servers and Solid state Devices (SSDs) [47], and implementing incremental checkpointing
[9]. Oliner, et al. present a strategy named coordinated checkpointing to skip unnecessary
checkpoint/restart operations [46]. At runtime, the application requests a checkpoint and
the system either allows or denies the checkpoint operation based on various system-wide
heuristics, including disk or network usage and reliability information.
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Liu, et al. present another reliability-aware optimal checkpoint/restart model for faulttolerant applications in a MPP system environment [38]. In this model, the optimal time
sequence of checkpoints is based on the theory of a stochastic renewal reward process.
The authors state that, in general, this model can be used with any failure model. They
tested their model with the Weibull distribution for time between failures based on their
analysis of failure data associated with an HPC system at Lawrence Livermore National
Lab (LLNL), for which about 80% of the data fit the Weibull distribution and 11% fit the
exponential distribution.
Although there are various studies related to other effective fault tolerant techniques,
still the most commonly used checkpoint/restart strategy is periodic checkpointing. And
for periodic checkpoint/restart an optimal checkpoint interval, as presented by Daly [21],
is based on the assumption of the exponential failure distribution. However, in a recent
paper, Arunagiri, et al. present a model, based on Daly’s model, that can be used to
identify an optimal checkpoint interval with respect to number of I/O operations [12]. The
authors observed that as the checkpoint interval increases, the trend related to the number
of I/O operations follows that of execution time (ref: Figure 1.3). This model assumes that
the failure distribution is exponential in nature and the results show that there is a region
where by increasing the checkpoint interval to a value higher than the optimal interval
identified by Daly’s model, the number of I/O operations can be drastically reduced. Our
research is based on this hypothesis.

2.2

Failure Distribution Pattern

Another important area related to this research is the distribution of failures in largescale computing systems. The optimal checkpoint strategy proposed by Daly assumes that
the failure distribution exhibits a Poisson single-component failure pattern [21]. Vaidya
mentions that processor failures are assumed to have the Poisson failure distribution [62].
However, the community is divided in this regard. Various studies show that the Weibull
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distribution is a better fit for failure distributions as compared to exponential or log-normal
distributions [52], [32], [64], [50], [43]. In addition there is published literature stating that
the gamma distribution is a good fit for failure models [34].
The main set-back in the study of failure patterns is the unavailability of failure data
of MPP clusters. In this regard, Carnegie Melon University (CMU) took the initiative
to create a repository of failure data known as the Computer Failure Data Repository
(CFDR) [4]. CFDR has made available failure data from various clusters, the largest
available failure data being from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). LANL released
failure data for 22 clusters collected over a period of nine years, from December 1996
to November 2005, which covers more than 23,000 outages. This data has been used in
various statistical studies to identify failure patterns, identify the root cause of failures,
and compute expected Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) and repair [52], [34] or to
help create failure prediction frameworks [25]. In [52], the authors perform a statistical
analysis of the inter-arrival time of failures and found that both system-wide and nodewise, the Weibull and gamma distributions fit the failure data well. However, their study
only provides a comparison of their log likelihood for exponential, Weibull, gamma and lognormal distributions, and concludes that the failure distribution is closer to the Weibull
distribution. They do not perform any standardized goodness of fit test. Also, the authors
only conducted the study of all failures occurring in the system. They have not classified
the failures pertaining to any particular category. In our study we classified the data as
hardware and software failures, and performed statistical curve-fitting analysis.
Kondo, et al. created a tool for comparative analysis of nine failure traces including
LANL traces [34]. Their research shows that Weibull, log-normal and gamma distributions are better in mapping the availability and unavailability trends than the exponential
distribution. However, there are three traces that fit exponential quite well.
Another widely analyzed source of failure data is the Reliability, Availability, and Serviceability (RAS) logs of the Blue Gene/P Intrepid system collected from January 2009 to
August 2009. Taerat conducted a study of the RAS logs to compute an application’s MTTI
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based on the RAS messages [44]. RAS logs have various temporal and spatial redundant
data. The authors consider only RAS logs that have severity levels labeled FAILURE or
FATAL. Also they filter out and discard messages with temporal redundancy. The study
attempts to strengthen the labeling of logs into FATAL and FAILURE logs by testing the
messages and trying to identify only those that eventually lead to failure. The authors disregarded the messages that did not cause any failures. Their strategy included both best
case dataset (only messages that will cause failures) and worst case dataset (both failure
messages and undetermined messages included). As expected, the MTTI is greater for the
best case and smaller for the worst case. As the time to repair (TTR) cannot be predetermined, the authors performed a sensitivity analysis of the MTTI by changing the TTR
from five minutes to eight hours with a five-minute step size. The MTTI based on different
TTRs was computed and presented graphically. Their results show that that the MTTI
does not vary with a repair time higher than 20 minutes . In another study, Zheng performed a co-analysis of RAS logs along with Blue Gene/P job logs, to filter redundant data
and then perform curve fitting on the filtered data to identify failure patterns [68]. Their
results suggest that the Weibull distribution fits better than the exponential distribution
for system-wide failure inter-arrival distributions based on Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). They use a likelihood ratio test as the statistic to evaluate the effectiveness
of these distributions. However, from the graphs presented, although we can see that the
Weibull distribution fits better than the exponential distribution, visually the exponential
distribution does not seem like a bad estimate. Alhough the Weibull distribution seems
to provide a better estimate, the exponential distribution is a simpler distribution. If the
error percentage of assuming an exponential over Weibull is small, for modeling reasons
the use of a simple function is helpful and easy to work with.
Another dataset available in the CFDR is the log of hardware failures recorded on the
MPP2 system (a 980-node HPC cluster) at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)
[4]. Zarza used this data in work related to fault-tolerant routing for multiple permanent
and non-permanent faults in HPC systems [66].
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Yet another viewpoint exists with respect to the occurrence of failures. Some researchers
believe that failures are not independent. In many failure conditions, like failures due
to power outages, multiple nodes of the system may fail simultaneously. Also different
applications running on the same node can fail due to a single failure condition. However,
these failures, although separately logged, are dependent on one another. This is the main
motivation behind the standpoint that failures are clustered. Hence, there are studies
related to finding clusters in the failures. Hacker performed a study of clustered failures
of data collected from two IBM Blue Gene systems at located at Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute (RPI) and at Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne (EPFL) in Lausanne,
Switzerland [30]. He showed that it is possible to partition the system into sets of nodes
ranked by reliability, which can be used to steer node allocation among scheduling queues
and guide checkpointing strategies to reduce the probability and costs of failure. The
authors initially identified dependencies, which appear as clusters or patterns in the data;
then they replaced these clusters with a smaller number of events to act as an independent
proxy for the dependent set of events; finally they measured the time between events in
the resulting dataset to determine the statistical distribution of the elapsed time between
independent, uncorrelated events and performed statistical fit. Their results show that the
Weibull distribution fits better than the exponential distribution. Thanakornworakij, et
al. performed a study on the effect of correlated failures on the reliability of systems [61].
They developed a model based on the Marshall-Olkin multivariate model with the Weibull
distribution that derives the values for reliability, failure rate and MTTI. Their study shows
that if components of the system have some dependency, the reliability decreases.
Most studies on failure distribution suggest that some dependence exists between failures. Thus, unlike the assumption made by Young [65] and Daly [21] that failure distribution is exponential in nature, exponential failure might not be a good estimate of failure
distribution. In our study we examine the effectiveness of the analytical model based on the
exponential distribution, Weibull distribution and the failure data available from various
clusters.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
To study the behavior of the number of checkpoint I/O operations and the execution
time as a function of the checkpoint interval for a real HPC application, experiments were
conducted with a popular HPC application on Ranger at TACC. The study was conducted
in three parts.
• First, collect data related to checkpoint/restart operations such as the size of checkpoint data, checkpoint latency, execution time, and number of checkpoint I/O operations for an application running on Ranger.
• Second, analyze failure distributions from historic failure data to ascertain representative values of MTTI.
• Third, conduct a simulation study driven by data collected from real experimental
runs and failure analysis.
Accordingly, this chapter is divided into three sections. In Section 3.1 we present the details
of the experiments conducted on Ranger, while Sections 3.2 and 3.3 present the methodologies used to perform the analysis of failure distributions and conduct the simulation
study.

3.1

HPC Experiments

The experiments conducted on Ranger used the RAxML and RAxML-Light applications,
which are both described in Section 3.1.1 In Section 3.1.2, the details of the modifications
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made to both of the applications are provided. Details of the experimental platform and
test datasets have been presented in Section 3.1.3.

3.1.1

Application

The application selected for this study, RAxML, is an important application that is widely
used and generally requires a long execution time. We used both RAxML (Randomized
Axelerated Maximum Likelihood) and RAxML-Light. Both are community codes used
for phylogenetic analysis. Phylogenetics is the study of evolutionary closeness among organisms. A phylogenetic tree is a mathematical structure representing the evolutionary
history of a group of organisms or genes [49]. Given a set of aligned proteins of gene sequences, the aim of a phylogenetic study is to determine among all possible trees which
one best describes the evolutionary relationships among the proteins. RAxML is used for
this. It is a program for sequential and parallel Maximum Likelihood-based inference of
large phylogenetic trees. It operates on both nucleotide and protein sequence alignments
[53]. RAxML employs several heuristics to drastically reduce likelihood search times [49].
These heuristics include:
1. an initial starting tree under parsimony using random stepwise addition;
2. lazy subtree Rearrangements for branch swapping;
3. GTR + CAT (GTR with per site rate categories) model for evaluation of an inference
tree instead of GTR + GAMMA; and
4. simulated annealing, which incorporates a cooling schedule and allows backward steps
during the hill-climbing process.
The inputs to RAxML are [56]:
• -s option sequence file
• -t option starting tree (optional)
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Figure 3.1: Output of Dendroscope
• -n option name of output file.
• -m option - substitution model (-m option)
RAxML begins the inference process by building a starting tree in PHYLIP format,
which is done progressively, i.e., adding the sequences one by one in random order and
inferring the best starting tree using the parsimony optimality criterion. Once the starting
tree has been generated, the tree optimization process is carried out. RAxML performs
standard sub-tree rearrangement (SPR) by subsequently removing all possible sub-trees
from the current best tree and re-inserting them into neighboring branches up to a specified
distance of nodes away. This process is repeated until there is no improvement in topology
to be found. The best tree is written as a text file. The original algorithm is presented in
a paper [53] and in a tutorial [49].
The output can be visualized using various visualization tools. However, the RAxML
community advises the use of the Dendroscope tool [2]. A sample output of Dendroscope
is shown above in Figure 3.1.
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Checkpointing in RAxML is initiated and controlled by the external library DMTCP,
which implements the coordinated checkpointing method by simultaneously suspended all
worker threads or processes during checkpointing, i.e., while the master thread performs
the checkpoint write [11]. Network data and kernel buffers are saved as a part of the
checkpoint data along with the state of the application. At the startup of a new process,
dmtcp checkpoint injects dmtcphijack.so into the user’s library and DMTCP adds a wrapper
to some of the libc functions to make it aware of
• all forked child processes,
• all attempts to create remote processes, and
• all the parameters by which all sockets are created.
During a normal failure-free execution cycle, the following steps are performed:
• The checkpoint manager thread in each process waits for a new checkpoint request
from the coordinator.
• Once, the checkpoint interval has elapsed, the coordinator sends a checkpoint request
to all worker threads. The user threads suspend work and the socket buffers are
drained and handshakes with peers are performed to discover the globally unique ID
of the remote side of all sockets.
• The connection information table is written to disk. All user space memory and socket
buffers are written to the checkpoint file along with a shell script, dmtcp restart script.sh,
which contains all the commands needed to restart the program. The checkpoint file
and restart script are written to persistent storage.
• Once the checkpoint file is written, the checkpoint write cycle is complete, the kernel
buffers are refilled and user threads resume operation.
In the case of a failure and restart, a single DMTCP restart process is created for
restoring each host. The sockets are recreated by referring to the globally unique ID in the
23

connection information table stored during checkpointing. Finally, the user processes are
recreated on each host.
During our work with RAxML, we discovered that the PThreads version of RAxML
7.2.6 was the only version that had DMTCP checkpoint support and it could scale up
to only one node (16 processors) [55]. Since we needed a checkpointing HPC application
that could run on multiple nodes, we migrated to RAxML-Light 1.0.5, which has inherent
support for checkpointing and can run on multiple nodes using MPI.
RAxML-Light is a reduced version of RAxML for inferring large trees under the CAT
approximation and GAMMA model of rate heterogeneity [54]. It can infer trees using
maximum likelihood given a starting tree from RAxML or the parsimonitor program or
a checkpoint file. It cannot perform bootstraps, searches on multiple trees, computation
of starting trees, which is done by RAxML. The tree inference procedure is the same as
explained for RAxML. Once execution is complete it outputs the best tree, which can be
visualized using the Dendroscope program
RAxML-Light is optimized for running on clusters and implements non-periodic checkpoint/restart. A checkpoint operation is performed after each Subtree Pruning and Regrafting (SPR) tree-optimization cycle. The inputs to RAxML-Light are:
• -s option sequence file
• -t option starting tree
• -R option checkpoint file
• -n option name of output file
• -m option substitution model

3.1.2

Modifications to RAxML and RAxML-Light

To collect checkpoint/restart data and to understand the checkpoint/restart behavior of
the application, it was required to execute the program in the presence of failures. This
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translates to unpredictable and extremely long executions of the application, which was
not feasible. To address this issue we extended RAxML and RAxML Light in the following
ways to induce simulated failures:
1. input file with failure times (in seconds),
2. simulation of a failure (checkpoint file write) at the times specified by the new input
file, and
3. simulation of a restart (checkpoint file read) after each simulated failure.
Another important modification caused checkpoints to be periodic, i.e., instead of being
based on completion of an SPR cycle, they were based on elapsed execution time. This was
necessary as most checkpoint strategies are based on performing checkpoint at a particular
time.
In addition, during simulations we needed to collect the following checkpoint/restart
data, which are required to study the performance of the two checkpoint models on real-life
application.
1. checkpoint latency for each checkpoint operation,
2. amount of data transferred during each checkpoint read or write operation,
3. total execution time required with and without restart,
4. total rework time at each restart,
5. total number of checkpoint writes,
6. number of restarts, which is the same as the number of failures, and
7. restart time or the time taken for the application to restore the state while restarting
from each failure.
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In addition, data not directly related to checkpoint/restart, such as the start and the
end time of each productive I/O operation and the count of productive I/O operations was
required to gain a better understanding of, and thus characterize, the RAxML application.
We considered the following two tools, both transparent to the user, to determine the
I/O characteristics of applications executed on Ranger. As described below, they were
insufficient for collecting the information required for our research (e.g., checkpoint latency)
and, thus, we had to add logging functions to the codes.
• TACC stats provides various data regarding a job’s execution, e.g., queue wait time,
run time, system idle time, I/O wait time, memory usage, amount of data read in
bytes, and amount of data written in bytes. It does not provide start and end times
of checkpoint read and write operations and the amount of data transferred during
each I/O operation, which is needed to compute checkpoint latency.
• Darshan, an I/O characterization tool from Argonne National Lab [16], can be used
to determine application I/O behavior. Darshan is implemented as a set of libraries
that are linked dynamically. It does not capture a complete I/O trace; rather, it
captures a trace of MPI-IO routine calls. This functionality is realized by inserting
wrapper functions in the profiling interface to MPI (PMPI) and POSIX routines,
which maintain a record for each file opened (when first opened, when finally closed,
and the total amount of data transferred). Darshan does not provide the information
we require regarding each and every checkpoint file read and write.
To add logging and failure-inducing functions to the code, we modified the external
library, DMTCP, which performs RAxML’s checkpointing. The logging functions log the
wall-clock start time (in milliseconds), wall-clock end time (in milliseconds), amount of
data transferred (in bytes), and type of operation performed, e.g., Checkpoint Write (CW),
Restart Read (RR), Productive Write (PW) or Productive Read (PR). They perform two
basic tasks: (i) whenever an event from the specified set of trigger events occurs, the wallclock time is stored into a memory buffer and (ii) the buffer is written to a file when one or
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more of the following conditions occur: the buffer becomes full, a certain pre-specified time
interval has passed, or the program completes its calculations. These functions were added
as wrappers to the original read write operations of DMTCP so that whenever a read or
write operation occurs, the data is collected.
The failure-inducing functions were added to the DMTCP library, which generates a
restart script during each checkpoint write operation. This script contains information
to restart the application using the latest checkpoint file. When a failure occurs, the
associated processes terminate. However, a process can be restarted by running its restart
script (dmtcp restart script.sh) using the latest checkpoint file. Our research required the
capability of injecting failures events and, therefore, we simulated failure events within
DMTCP. This was done by interrupting the application logically and not terminating it as
in real failures. When interrupted a process reads the checkpoint file and resumes operation.
The start time of each injected failure was read from in an external text document.
Since RAxML-Light is a reduced version of the original RAxML, the changes made to
DMTCP for RAxML were directly migrated to RAxML-Light with minor syntactic changes.
The overall semantic behavior was preserved. However, since the analytical models we are
using are based on time-periodic checkpointing, the RAxML-Light code was modified to
simulate time-periodic checkpoint writes. Instead of RAxML-Light writing a checkpoint
file to persistent storage after each SPR cycle, it was changed to store that checkpoint
state in memory and write that file to disk only after a specified checkpoint interval had
elapsed. To do this, after each SPR cycle, the checkpoint state was saved in memory but
the actual write to disk was performed later. The time period between checkpoints, i.e.,
the checkpoint interval was an input parameter.

3.1.3

Experimental Platform

The modified codes were tested at The University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP) before
being used for experiments at TACC. The systems used at UTEP and TACC are described
below.
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Figure 3.2: Ranger at Texas Advanced Computing Center
1. UTEP Test Bed:
• Dell PowerEdge SC 1420 computer with two Intel Xeon RK80546KG0721M
processors capable of Hyper-threading running CentOS 5.3
• 30 GB disk storage
2. TACC MPP System, Ranger:
• 3,936 16-way SMP compute nodes (15,744 four-core AMD Opteron processors
for a total of 62,976 compute cores)
• 123 TB RAM
• 1.7 PB disk storage
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• 579 TFLOPS peak performance
Test datasets were downloaded from the RAxML website used for the 2007 Supercomputing paper on parallelizing RAxML on the IBM BlueGene/L [1]. Also a large dataset
was downloaded from the iPTOL project website [5] for scalability testing; this dataset
contained 34,584 taxa with 1,303 columns. The results of these experiments are reported
in Section 4.

3.2

Failure Data Analysis

In an effort to define a realistic value for the node MTTI parameter of the models worked
with in this research (and the simulations that we conducted, which are described in Section 4) and to verify whether the failure distribution is indeed exponential, as is assumed by
the models, or Weibull, suggested by different literatures, we analyzed the historic failure
data made available by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in 2006. The LANL data
consists of records of cluster node outages, workload logs and error logs of 22 clusters collected from December 1996 through November 2005. The data was collected as a remedy
database, where the system administrators of the 22 clusters updated details of the node
failures that required system administrative intervention for resolution. The data has been
classified into five large categories: human error (149 errors), environment (357 errors),
network failure (420 failures), software failure (5,302 errors), and hardware failure (14,291
failures). There were some failures that could not be classified and were recorded under
the unresolved category (3,094 failures). As shown, the two major contributors of failures
were hardware and software failures. Accordingly, we conducted a study of the hardware
and software failure inter-arrival time to find which statistical distribution best describes
the failure pattern of each system, and to define a realistic value for node MTTI.
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3.2.1

Preprocessing of the Failure Logs

In order to study the pattern of inter-arrival time of failures, we had to pre-process the
logs to infer inter-arrival times. Since the log files contain the time of every failure for each
node of a system, we were able to compute the time since the last failure, which is derived
data, for a variety of failures. The program for performing this computation is presented
in the appendix of [31]. The log was pre-processed to compute the following derived data:
1. Time since last node repair,
2. Time since last node upgrade,
3. Time since last node software failure.
4. Time since last node maintenance,
5. Time since last system repair,
6. Time since last system upgrade,
7. Time since last system software failure, and
8. Time since last system maintenance.
Since, the hardware and software failures were the largest contributors to failures in the
clusters, this data was sub-divided into hardware and software failures. Errors like human
errors and facilities errors cannot be controlled and are not predictable based on environmental factors, thus, associated data was not considered. Once the data preprocessing was
completed, statistical curve fitting tests were carried out on the available data.

3.2.2

Statistical Distribution Fitting

As discussed earlier, analysis of the failure distribution could potentially be helpful for
estimating the checkpoint interval and reducing the number of checkpoint I/O operations
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of an HPC application. For time-critical applications, the optimal checkpoint interval that
provides minimum execution time is given by Daly’s model [21] and several others [37] [46]
[38] for systems with failure distributions that fit exponential and Weibull distributions,
respectively. Analysis of historic failure data helps ascertain the failure patterns historically
exhibited in existing or retired systems and provides a good starting point for investigating
failure patterns in current systems.
To perform the analysis, the following five tasks were performed.
1. Generate three histograms for a system: one of all hardware and software failures,
one of only hardware failures and one of only software failures.
2. Examine how well these failures fit well-known statistical distributions referred to in
reliability studies, namely exponential and Weibull.
3. Perform curve fitting using the fitdistrplus package of R; the Maximum-Likelihood
Estimation was used as the method to fit distributions.
4. For each distribution, validate the analysis using the three commonly used goodnessof-fit tests, i.e., Kolmogorov-Smirnov(K-S) [41], Anderson-Darling(A-D) [10] and
Cramer-von-Mises(CvM) [22].
Using the LANL logs, we also analyzed the data for mean-time-to-interrupt (MTTI);
this data was for use in our simulation studies. We only considered the hardware errors
for this estimation; the software errors are mainly related to either disk or I/O drivers,
software upgrades or other unknown software failures, and, generally, it is not possible to
predict a software failure. During the lifetime of a system, the software may be upgraded
or replaced if required, hence, the trend and type of software failures can change during the
lifetime of a system. However, the hardware of the system generally remains unchanged
during the system lifetime and some hardware errors can be predicted or speculated based
on the environmental conditions. The analysis of the MTTI was carried out for two LANL
systems (systems 18 and 19). These systems were selected based on two factors:
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1. They had the largest number of nodes, i.e., 1,024 nodes, each with four processors.
2. They had large failure counts. System 18 had 2,967 hardware failures and system 19
has 2,549 hardware failures reported (excluding maintenance activities).
We used two methods for determining the MTTI for these two systems: MTTI based
on all the failure data and MTTI based on a subset, i.e., n years, of data. The first method
employed the following process:
1. For each node, all times to interrupt (TTIs) were computed and the average of these
values was taken to be the MTTI of that particular node.
2. For each node with no failures recorded, the largest reported TTI for all other nodes
was considered to be its MTTI.
3. Once the MTTI for each node was computed, the MTTI of any node of the system was
computed as the average of the computed node MTTIs. This was possible because
all the nodes had the same number of processors, i.e., four, and similar memory and
CPU configurations.
4. Once the average node MTTI was computed, the system MTTI was computed as
M T T Isystem =

M T T Inode
.
N umberof N odes

The second method, MTTI based on n years of failure data, only considered those
failures that occurred within n years of installing the system. It employed the same process
described above. This analysis was done to see how a system’s MTTI changes over time.
This also helps us understand how well we can estimate the MTTI of a system during its
initial deployment period and after this period. For the analysis of failure data during the
initial period of deployment, we used n = 1, 2, and 3. The results of our analyses are
presented in Section 4.3.
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3.3

Simulation Studies

The data collected from the experiments on Ranger and the failure analysis were used
in simulation studies performed to analyze the impact of the checkpoint interval on the
number of checkpoint I/O operations and execution time. The simulator, which was coded
in Java and is presented in [31], is designed as follows. The input for the simulations
discussed in this thesis are noted in parantheses.
1. Input:
(a) Job list (which can contain multiple jobs), i.e., an input file where each job entry
specifies: the job arrival time, solution time (in minutes), checkpoint interval (in
minutes), restart overhead (in minutes), checkpoint latency (in minutes) and
number of nodes to run required to run the application (the characteristics of
RAxML-Light were used to define these parameters and the checkpoint latency
was based on our HPC experiments run on 100 nodes of Ranger);
(b) Arrival times of the jobs in the job list multiple jobs can be concurrently executed;
i. A job’s arrival time equates to its simulation start time it is the time when
the job is expected to start running, expressed as the time elapsed since the
allocated nodes were installed (in minutes), e.g., if a job is supposed to run
on x nodes of system Y , which were installed at time Ts , with a start time
of t, then this implies the job will run from time Ts + t and is expected to
face failures that occur on those x nodes of system Y that occur after that
time;
(c) Number of nodes in the simulated system (1,024 as per LANL systems 18 and
19); and
(d) External file that provides system failure information (failure files for LANL
systems 18 and 19) this includes times at which failures occur and repair times.
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2. Process: During a simulation,
(a) The above-mentioned inputs are read;
(b) Based on the inputs, the scheduler is initialized to the earliest start time of the
jobs waiting in the job queue. Initially all nodes are expected to be available.
The list of available nodes of the system is maintained for scheduling purposes;
as nodes are allocated for each job, this list is modified accordingly.
(c) All jobs are maintained in a job queue. The scheduler reads the jobs from the
job queue in the order of arrival time from the job queue. If the number of
nodes requested by a job is not available (i.e., the nodes are busy executing
some other jobs), the job is kept in the wait priority queue, the priority being
based on job arrival time. Thus, a job with earliest arrival time is expected to
have maximum priority and run immediately when nodes are available. Once
nodes are available, the top priority job in the wait queue that requires the
available number of nodes or less starts (or restarts) operation.
(d) The scheduler maintains a heap of events and performs operations based on the
event type. The event heap is a min heap. Thus the operation that will occur
earliest will always be polled by the scheduler.
(e) Initially job each job a new event in created with time equal to the job arrival
time and type equal to job scheduled. The failures start time associated with
each node failure is added as a new event with failure start type and time equal
to the failure start time (read from inputs).
(f) The scheduler polls the event queue till there are no more events or all jobs have
finished. The events that are encountered during the lifetime of the execution
are as follows:
i. Event job scheduled: If there are available resources for the job to run, then
the job is scheduled to run. Otherwise the job is added to the wait priority
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queue. For jobs that can run immediately, the timenow is updated with
time to perform restart. A new event with type as checkpoint start and
time equal to timenow + checkpointinterval for that job is created. This
event is added to the event heap.
ii. Event checkpoint start: The execution time is updated by adding the checkpoint interval. The latency is added to present time to compute the checkpoint end time. A new event is created (Checkpoint End) with the time
equal to the checkpoint end time and is included in the event queue.
iii. Event checkpoint finish: The latency is added to the execution time of the
job. The last checkpoint time is updated to the checkpoint start perform
time. The next time to perform checkpoint is computed as the next checkpoint start time. If the computation to be done is less than the checkpoint
interval, i.e., the job will finish before next checkpoint write operation, a
new event is created as Job finished with time equal to the time to finish
the job. Otherwise a new Checkpoint Start event with the time equal to the
next checkpoint start time is created. In both the cases, the created event
is added to the event heap.
iv. Event failure start: This implies a node that is running has failed. Thus,
the corresponding job will fail. All other nodes are freed and put in the
list of available nodes. The job is put into the wait priority queue. The
scheduler is invoked to see if there is any job that can start execution. The
repair time for this failure is added to the failure start time to compute the
failure end time. A new event is created (Failure End) with the time equal
to the failure end time and is put into the event heap.
v. Event failure end: This event means that a node has been repaired. This
event is put into the event heap. The repaired node is added to the list of
available nodes. The scheduler is invoked to see whether it can schedule any
new jobs.
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vi. Event job finished: The duration elapsed between the time now and the last
job start time is added to the execution time. The job is removed from the
job queue. The nodes are freed and added to list of available resources. The
count for finished jobs is increased. The scheduler is invoked to see whether
any job can be rescheduled with the newly available resources.
(g) For each job, the checkpoint interval, along with the expected latency, is specified
in its entry in the job list. When the checkpoint interval has elapsed, the job
writes a single checkpoint file to disk and its execution time is incremented by
the expected latency to write the file.
3. Output: Once all jobs are completed, the simulation is complete. The simulator then
outputs:
• execution time of each job,
• number of checkpoint write operations, and
• number of failures that occurred.
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Chapter 4
Results
As stated earlier, the main objectives of our research are to:
• Study the variation of the execution time and the number of I/O operations as a
function of the checkpoint interval.
• Investigate patterns in historic failure data to provide information for realistic values
of expected node and system MTTI and for scheduling of checkpoints.
• Using historic failure data, conduct a simulation-based study of a selected HPC application to determine the percentage error of the estimates of execution time and
number of I/O operations made by the two analytical models.
A secondary objective of this research is to predict the MTTI of the system based on
n years of historic failure data. The objective is to determine the percentage error of the
estimates of execution time and number of I/O operations made by the two analytical
models using this predicted MTTI in their computation.
As described previously, both a study of HPC execution of RAxML and RAxML-Light,
and a simulation-based study that uses historical failure data were employed to determine
the percentage error of the execution time and number of checkpoint I/O operations estimated by the two analytical models under study. The methodology used to conduct the
experiments that achieve these objectives was described in the last chapter. This chapter
presents the results of these experiments. The results of our analysis of failure data is
presented in Section 4.1, which is followed by the study the variation of the execution time
and number of checkpoint I/O operations as a function checkpoint interval for RAxML and
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RAxML-Light executed on Ranger, which is presented in Section 4.2. In this study simulated failures with exponential distribution were injected into application runs. To study
the effects of running RAxML-Light for longer durations on a larger number of nodes, with
failure events occurring as recorded in the LANL failure remedy database, studies were performed on a Java simulator using the checkpoint/restart parameters collected from running
RAxML-Light on Ranger. The results of this simulation study are presented in Section 4.3.

4.1

Analysis of Failure Data

As described in Section 3.2, the hardware and software failure data from LANL, taken
together and individually, were analyzed using R to find statistical distributions that best
fit the data; fitdistrplus was employed for curve fitting. The Weibull and exponential
distributions were considered since they are the two most popular distributions associated
in terms of trends of failure inter-arrival times. The process used to analyze the selected
hardware and software failure data follows:
1. Compute the following inter-arrival times:
(a) Inter-arrival time between any failures, i.e., time since last failure,
(b) Inter-arrival time between hardware failures, i.e., time since last repair; and
(c) Inter-arrival time between software failures, i.e., time since last software failure.
2. Perform curve-fitting tests, using Maximum Likelihood test, for hardware failures,
software failure and hardware-software failures taken together for each of the 22 systems.
3. Conduct the goodness-of-fit tests using K-S, A-D and C-v-M tests.
4. Repeat the same curve-fitting tests for each node of any system that had more than 30
failures. The system considered was system 2, in which 25 out of 49 nodes had more
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than 30 failures. For the other 21 systems there were very few nodes that qualified
for this test and, hence, they were not considered.
1. Hardware-Software System-wide Failure Analysis:
For each cluster or system, the results of performing statistical distribution fit for
all hardware and software failures taken together have been provided. The shape
and scale factor for the best fit Weibull distribution and the rate for the exponential
distribution have been presented. Finally, the measure of the goodness-of-fit has been
provided. The 3 goodness-of-fit tests (mentioned in section 3.2.2) are run and if the
result fails the test it is mentioned as R (Rejected). Otherwise if the fit is not rejected,
it has been shown with NR. For system 17, these tests were not performed as failure
record contained null values.
The results are provided in Table 4.1.
As shown by the data in Table 4.1, 9 out of 22 systems conform to the Weibull distribution whereas 4 out of 22 systems conform to exponential distribution. For systems
3, 4, 5, and 6, which conform to both Weibull distribution and exponential distribution, the shape factor of the Weibull distribution is close to 1. This is understandable
since it is known that a Weibull distribution with a shape factor = 1 is an exponential
distribution.
Thus, the study conformed to the popular belief that a Weibull distribution better
estimates the failure distribution than does an exponential distribution. Note, however, that an exponential distribution also matched in 45% of the cases; hence, the
hypothesis that a failure distribution can be exponential cannot be disregarded completely. Figure 4.1a above present the curve fitting graphs of those elements for which
any of the goodness-of-fit test did not reject exponential distribution. Figure 4.1b
below, show the plots of graphs for which Weibull distribution is not rejected. The
plots show that the inter-arrival time conforms closely to statistical distributions like
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Table 4.1: Hardware-Software System-wide Failure Analysis
Goodness-of-fit for
Cluster # exponential distribution

Goodness-of-fit for
Weibull distribution

Shape

Scale

Mean

K-S

A-D

C-v-M

K-S

A-D

C-v-M

2

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.65

3

NR

NR

NR

NR

R

R

0.98 1,529.97 6.50E-04

4

NR

R

NR

NR

R

R

0.96 1,447.75 6.80E-04

5

NR

R

NR

NR

R

R

0.99 1,619.20 6.20E-04

6

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

R

1.11 1,805.67 5.80E-04

7

R

R

R

NR

R

R

0.65

8

R

R

R

NR

R

R

0.68 1,646.70 4.80E-04

9

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.79 2,400.88 3.80E-04

10

R

R

R

R

R

R

1.01 2,863.33 3.50E-04

11

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.72 2,105.15 4.10E-04

12

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.76 2,222.76 4.00E-04

13

R

R

R

R

R

R

1.02 3,008.12 3.30E-04

14

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.68 1,468.95 5.70E-04

15

R

R

R

NR

R

R

0.79

50.36 1.70E-02

16

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.64

102.97 6.20E-03

18

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.80

1809.91 5.00E-04

19

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.83 1,783.54 5.20E-04

20

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.57

688.09 9.60E-04

21

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.61

330.98 2.30E-03

22

R

R

R

NR

R

R

0.77

131.85 6.40E-03

23

NR

R

R

NR

R

R

0.81

137.73 6.40E-03
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133.78 5.10E-03

135.30 5.20E-03

(a) Exponential Distribution was “Not Rejected”

(b) Weibull Distribution was“Not Rejected”

Figure 4.1: System Hardware-Software Failure Inter-arrival Time Distributions
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exponential and Weibull. The probability of occurrence of failures is high after repair
from a failure.
2. Hardware Only System-wide Failure Analysis:
As described in Section 4.1, the hardware failures for all 22 LANL systems were
taken collectively and curve fitting was carried out for each system. As system 7
had less than 30 hardware failures and, thus, is not included in this analysis. Also
system 17 was not considered, because the LANL log entries for it was incomplete.
In table 4.2 the result of curve fitting for hardware failures have been presented. The
table contains same information as in the Table 4.1 for Hardware-Software systemwide failure analysis.
Figures 4.2a and 4.2b, present the plots for those systems for which the curve fitting
results were favourable.
In analyzing only the hardware failure data, we found that the failures of ten systems
conformed to the Weibull distribution, i.e., they were not rejected by the curve fitting,
and five conformed to the exponential distribution. Overall, as compared to the combined hardware and software failures, the hardware failures of these 22 systems more
closely follow the Weibull distribution. Accordingly, a better prediction of hardware
errors is possible. The rate of failure varies from 0.000034 to 0.0017. The shape factor
of the reference Weibull distribution varies from 0.53 to 1.27. Figures 4.2a and 4.2b
show the plots for those systems, which were not rejected by any of the goodness
of fit tests, for exponential distribution and Weibull distribution respectively. For 3
out of 20 systems, higher order AD test was successful and for 1 out of 20 cases the
CvM test gave positive results. Also the CvM test was successful only for exponential distribution and not for Weibull. From the figures (4.2a and 4.2b) of system 6,
we can visually conclude that exponential distribution is a better fit than Weibull
distribution.
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Table 4.2: Hardware System-wide Failure Analysis
Goodness-of-fit for
Cluster # exponential distribution

Goodness-of-fit for
Weibull distribution

Shape

Scale

Mean

K-S

A-D

C-v-M

K-S

A-D

C-v-M

2

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.69

3

NR

R

R

NR

NR

R

1.13 5,738.37 6.00E-05

4

NR

R

R

NR

R

R

1.08 5,591.28 6.00E-05

5

R

R

R

NR

R

R

1.11 5,611.77 6.00E-05

6

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

R

1.27 6,344.28 5.70E-05

8

R

R

R

NR

R

R

0.72 5,842.76 4.70E-05

9

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.80 7,393.54 4.00E-05

10

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.96 8,319.34 4.00E-05

11

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.76 6,833.16 4.30E-05

12

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.72 6,279.03 4.70E-05

13

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.98 8,842.43 3.70E-05

14

NR

R

NR

NR

R

R

0.96 5,797.75 5.70E-05

15

R

R

R

NR

R

R

0.71

150.95 1.70E-03

16

R

R

R

NR

R

R

0.60

699.58 3.00E-04

18

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.82 6,441.64 4.70E-05

19

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.93 6,540.88 5.00E-05

20

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.53 2,353.69 8.70E-05

21

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.54

921.71 2.40E-04

22

R

R

R

NR

NR

R

0.61

692.39 3.00E-04

23

NR

R

R

NR

NR

R

0.78

927.82 3.10E-04

679.74 3.70E-04

3. Software Only System-wide Failure Analysis:
Similarly for analysing software failures of all 22 LANL systems taken collectively,
curve fitting was carried out for each system. Since software failures are much lesser
in number than hardware failures as described in Section 3.2 6 out of 22 systems
of LANL(6,12,13,14,15,21) had less than 30 hardware failures and, thus, were not
included in this analysis. Also system 17 was not considered, for similar reasons state
above. In table 4.3 the result of curve fitting for software failures have been presented.
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(a) Exponential Distribution was “Not Rejected”

(b) Weibull Distribution was“Not Rejected”

Figure 4.2: System Hardware Failure Inter-arrival Time Distributions
The table contains the results of the goodness of fit test for KS, AD and CvM tests,
described in section 3.2.2. Also the shape and scale factor of the best fitted Weibull
distribution and the rate parameter of the best fit exponential distribution has also
been presented. Figures 4.3a and 4.3b, present the plots for those systems for which
the curve fitting results were “Not Rejected” by any of the three goodness of fit tests.

Curve fitting could only be carried out on fifteen of twenty-two systems, seven systems
did not have failures greater than 30. Analysis of the software failure data showed
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Table 4.3: Software System-wide Failure Analysis
Goodness-of-fit for

Goodness-of-fit for

Cluster # exponential distribution Weibull distribution

Shape

Scale

Mean

K-S

A-D

C-v-M

K-S

A-D

C-v-M

2

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.51

644.92 2.20E-04

3

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.80

2,839.01 1.00E-04

4

R

R

R

NR

R

R

0.90

2,358.38 1.30E-04

5

R

R

R

NR

R

R

0.58

3,576.46 6.30E-05

7

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.51

321.79 4.00E-04

8

NR

R

R

R

R

R

0.82

8,551.78 3.70E-05

9

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.94 11,230.22 2.90E-05

10

R

R

R

R

R

R

2.95 15,569.62 2.30E-05

11

R

R

R

R

R

R

1.55 13,002.56 2.70E-05

16

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.59

634.4863 3.10E-04

18

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.81

7,250.36 4.00E-05

19

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.68

6,065.5 4.30E-05

20

R

R

R

R

R

R

0.65

4,672.14 5.30E-05

22

R

R

R

NR

R

R

0.55

909.01 2.10E-04

23

R

R

R

NR

NR

R

0.68

1,097.17 2.40E-04

that four out of fifteen systems were not rejected for the Weibull distribution and one
was not rejected for the exponential distribution; and notice that none of the systems
passed the higher order tests for goodness of fit. Unlike hardware failures, less software failures conformed to the well-known failure distributions. The data for system
3, which fits the Weibull distribution when hardware and software failures were considered together, did not fit this distribution when software failures were considered
alone. From the plots we can see that even for those systems for which the not rejected by either Weibull or exponential distribution, does not visually comparable to
the hardware data curves. The rate estimated from exponential distribution varies
widely from 0.000023 to 0.0004. The shape factor for Weibull distribution is less than
1 for thirteen out of fifteen cases.
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(a) Exponential Distribution was “Not Rejected”

(b) Weibull Distribution was“Not Rejected”

Figure 4.3: System Software Failure Inter-arrival Time Distributions
4. Estimation of MTTI
To estimate the MTTI of a system, the average MTTI of the nodes was computed.
Since the date of installation of every node on the studied LANL systems was provided
along with the timestamp of the start of every failure, the computation of the MTBF
of each node was easily completed. If there were no failure records for a node, that
node was assumed to be alive for the entire time duration. Once the node MTTI of
each node of a system was computed, an average node MTTI was computed. Finally,
the system MTTI was computed as SM T T I =

N odeM T T I
.
N umberof N odes

The systems with same number of nodes and similar configurations, i.e., systems 3, 4
and 5; systems 9, 10 and 11; and systems 18 and 19, have similar MTTIs. Systems 2
and 15 have a largest number of processors per node, i.e., 128 and 256, respectively.
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Table 4.4: MTTI computed from LANL data
System

Number of

Number of Processors

Number

Nodes

per Node

Average Node

System

MTTI (days) MTTI (days)

2

49

80 and 128

44

0.89

3

128

4

358

2.79

4

128

4

380

2.97

5

128

4

369

2.88

6

32

4

374

11.68

7

1

8

182

182.00

8

164

2

943

5.75

9

256

2

644

2.52

10

256

2

623

2.43

11

256

2

624

2.44

12

512

2

694

1.36

13

256

2

654

2.56

14

128

2

527

4.12

15

1

256

8

8.22

16

16

128

55

3.44

18

1024

4

473

0.46

19

1024

4

472

0.46

20

512

4

528

1.03

21

128

4

134

1.04

22

1

4

47

46.92

23

5

32 and128

76

15.2

Accordingly, systems with a smaller number of nodes t, with the exception of system
2, have a greater MTTI. Confirming an observation in [52], the MTTIs of systems
2, 15, 16 and 23, which are NUMA-based systems, are quite different from that of
the other systems, which are SMP-based clusters. So we can see that memory access
patterns have an impact of the MTTI of the systems.

47

4.2

Experiments on Ranger

As explained in Section 3.1, RAxML and RAxMLLight were executed on Ranger at TACC.
Since RAxML (with DMTCP checkpointing) could not run on more than one node, we only
ran it to collect information that would allow us to profile the I/O of RAxML. In contrast,
RAxML-Light was used to study the variation of execution time and the number of I/O
operations as a function of the checkpoint interval.

4.2.1

RAxML Experiments

We executed four runs of RAxML on one node of Ranger to determine RAxML’s I/O characteristics. We ran with two different checkpoint interval (16.67 minutes and 30 minutes)
respectively to study the I/O statistics. The results have been presented in Table 4.5. Also
the plots for I/O data is shown in Figure 4.4.
Table 4.5: Parameters for RAxML Experiment
Checkpoint Interval

Number of checkpoint

Number of productive

(in minutes)

I/O Operations

I/O operations

16.67

7

16

30.00

5

16

As shown in Figure 4.4, RAxML’s productive I/O (red) is periodic and bursty, while its
defensive (checkpoint) I/O (green) is periodic. For the problem size of 500 gene sequences
(or taxa), each of length 5000, the volume of defensive I/O was about 22MB, whereas the
volume of the productive I/O was 4KB. Thus, in the case of RAxML, the defensive I/O is
the main user of I/O utilization.

4.2.2

RAxML-Light Experiments

Since RAxML 7.2.6 cannot run on more than one node, RAxML-Light 1.0.6 was used to
experiment with larger node counts. In all the test runs i.e. 3 run for each checkpoint
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Figure 4.4: RAxML on Ranger: I/O Characteristics of RAxML 7.2.6
interval we employed four nodes, i.e., 16 processors; however, we ran a couple of short
duration experiments (less than 5 hours) on 100 nodes to measure the checkpoint latency
of RAxML-Light on larger number of nodes. This was conducted to compute the average latency in case we run an application on 100 nodes which would indeed help in our
simulation studies for longer durations (presented in section 4.3).
This experiment was conducted to observe the variation of the number of I/O operations
and the execution time as a function of the checkpoint interval for RAxML-Light executing
on Ranger.
Experiments in this set were conducted by simulating failure and restart during the
execution of RAxML-Light on Ranger. The simulated failures assume an exponential failure
distribution with parameter values of node MTTI equal to 24 hours and 32 hours. This
assumption was made to ensure that we have a reasonable number of failures during the
execution of the application with solution time of 20 hours. The number of nodes in this
experiment was 4 and therefore the system MTTI corresponding to node MTTI of 24
hours and 32 hours was 6 hours and 8 hours, respectively. Although this seems unrealistic
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at the outset, it seems reasonable considering the fact that the next generation Exascale
systems are predicted to have system MTTI about 1 hour. This is due to the fact that
millions of components work together in such large scale systems. Since the goal of this
study is to investigate the variation of the number of I/O operations and the execution
time as a function of the checkpoint interval, the choice of and the range of values of the
independent variable, the checkpoint interval is important. For these experiments we chose
to use 0.5τopt , τopt , 2τopt , and4τopt as checkpoint intervals at which we measure the number
of I/O operations and the execution time, where τopt is the optimal checkpoint interval with
respect to the execution time. Recall that τopt depends on system MTTI and since we use
two values of system MTTI this leads to 8 experiments in total.
Configuration and parameter values:
• Number of Nodes: 4 nodes (64 cores)
• Specification of Ranger Node: Each node contains four AMD Opteron Quad-Core 64bit processors (16 cores in all) on a single board, as an SMP unit. The core frequency
is 2.3 GHz and supports 4 floating-point operations per clock period with a peak
performance of 9.2 GFLOPS/core or 128 GFLOPS/node. Each node contains 32
GB of memory. The memory subsystem has a 1.0 GHz HyperTransport system Bus,
and 2 channels with 667 MHz DDR2 DIMMS. Each socket possesses an independent
memory controller connected directly to an L3 cache [RangerUserGuide].
• Input data set: Dataset containing 17000 gene sequences (taxa) of 1303 genetic characters
• System MTTI: 6 hours and 8 hours
• Number of checkpoint intervals: 4 per value of MTTI, 8 total.
• Number of experiments: total of 24, three repetitions for each distinct combination
of MTTI and checkpoint interval.
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Table 4.6: Results from RAxML-Light Execution
MTTI

Checkpoint

Average Execution

(hrs)

Interval (secs)

Time (hrs)

8

Rework

Checkpoint Operations Time (secs)

( 12 τopt )

21.02

2,761

73

52 (τopt )

21.80

1,467

67

114 (2τopt )

21.36

637

189

228 (4τopt )

26.05

353

496

30 ( 12 τopt )

20.32

2,761

33

60 (τopt )

21.40

1298

36

120 (2τopt )

19.02

637

99

240 (4τopt )

19.20

353

586

26
6

Number of

• Solution time: 20 hours
In Table 4.6, we present the checkpoint intervals used, the MTTI used,
Figure 4.5a depicts the variation in the measured number of I/O operations in terms of
the checkpoint interval in relationship to the number of I/O operations estimated by the
model described in [12] (green line). As can be seen, the actual number conforms closely
to the the values estimated by analytical model; the error is less than 6% for an MTTI of
six hours and 15% for an MTTI of eight hours. These results validate the prediction of the
analytical model, i.e., that by increasing the checkpoint interval to twice the optimal value
with respect to execution time, the number of I/O operations is reduced to almost half.
Figure 4.5b depicts the variation in execution time in terms of the checkpoint interval
in relationship to the expected execution time estimated by the model described in [21]
(green line). The execution time behavior does not conform to the analytical model. The
percentage error varied from 5% to 30% for MTTI of 8 hours and 1.5% to 8% for MTTI of
6 hours. However, as the number of experiments conducted was only 3 and the condition
of experiments varied, the anomaly could not be explained.
Figure 4.5c depicts the rework time due to failures encountered in any simulation. As
expected the rework time should increase with increase in checkpoint interval. The rework
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(a) Number of I/O operations vs. checkpoint interval

(b) Execution Time vs. checkpoint interval
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(c) Rework Time vs. checkpoint interval

Figure 4.5: RAxML-Light on Ranger with System MTTI 6 and 8 hours

time is similar for optimal checkpoint interval and half optimal checkpoint interval is same.
Also for twice optimal the rework time in only 1 - 2 minutes greater than optimal checkpoint
interval. Thus, checkpointing at a higher frequency does not cause greater impact on rework
time.
The main motivation behind running these simulations was to collect the latency data
of running the dataset, mentioned in earlier segments of this section 4.2.2. This experiment
was done to understand how checkpoint latency scales with the number of nodes. For this
RAxML-Light was run on 16 and 100 nodes of Ranger. In Table 4.7, the latency observed
has been presented
Table 4.7: Latency of RAxML-Light dataset running on different number of nodes on
Ranger
Sl. No

4.3

Number of Nodes

Latency (average of 30 writes) in seconds

1

16

0.102

2

100

0.17

Simulator with LANL failure data

Our simulation study (the details of which are described in Section 3.3 uses the checkpoint
latency defined by running RAxML-Light on 100 nodes of Ranger (i.e., 0.17 seconds ) and
MTTIs based on the hardware failure data from the two LANL clusters with the largest
number of nodes, i.e., systems 18 and 19. Based on all failure data, the node MTTI for
systems 18 and 19 was 472 days; it was 410 days for system 19 based on failure data
collected during the first two years of production. We assume 300 jobs and a job length of
10 days. The checkpoint interval is varied from one minute to 1,400 minutes, in increments
of 1 minute till under 100 minutes and in increments of 10 minutes there after. For each
checkpoint interval the simulator reports the average execution time and average number
of I/O operations of the 300 jobs, which is reported below.
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First, in Figure 4.6, we compare the increase (in minutes) in execution time with the
increase in the size of the checkpoint interval for simulations on system18. The average
simulated execution time of the 300 jobs is depicted by the blue line, while that predicted
by Daly’s model is depicted by the green line. The percentage error of the model in terms
of execution time is less than 2% during the 10-day duration, and the maximum difference
between the simulated and predicted execution times is 2.33 hours.

Figure 4.6: Simulation of RAxML-Light with Node MTTI of 472 Days on System 18:
Execution Time vs. Checkpoint Interval
Next, Figure 4.7 allows us to compare the simulated number of checkpoint I/O operations with that predicted by Arunagiri’s model. The percentage error in the predicted
number of checkpoint I/O operations is less than 7%, and the maximum difference between
the simulated and predicted number of checkpoint I/O operations is 0.83.
These results show that, even with historic failure data that does not conform to an
exponential failure distribution, as is assumed by the models, the checkpoint I/O model
and the checkpoint execution-time model both perform well with percentage errors less
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Figure 4.7: Simulation of RAxML-Light with Node MTTI of 472 Days on System 18:
Number of Checkpoint I/O Operations vs. Checkpoint Interval
than 7% and 2%, respectively.
To explore whether using a value of MTTI estimated using failure data from the first
two years of production can be used in the analytical models with the same effectiveness
as the MTTI computed using all the failure data, we performed a similar experiment with
two different values of MTTI, i.e., the first computed using all the failure data for system
19, i.e., an MTTI of 472 days, and the second computed using the first two years of this
failure data, i.e., an MTTI of 410 days. The results of these experiments follow.
In Figure 4.8, we compare the increase (in minutes) in execution time with the increase
in the size of the checkpoint interval for simulations on system19 with MTTI of 411 and
472 days.
In Figure 4.9, we compare the increase (in minutes) in number of I/O operations with
the increase in the size of the checkpoint interval for simulations on system19 with MTTI
of 411 and 472 days.
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Figure 4.8: Simulation of RAxML-Light with Node MTTI of 472 and 410 Days on System
19: Execution Time vs. Checkpoint Interval
In Figure 4.10, we present the percentage error in using the overall MTTI of 472 days
and MTTI based on two years i.e., 410 days.
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 depict the simulated execution time and number of checkpoint I/O
operations generated for a range of checkpoint intervals (i.e., from one minute to 1440
minutes, in increments of 1 till less than 100 minutes and increment of 10 above that). As
can be seen, Daly’s execution-time model tracks the simulated execution time fairly well,
with errors increasing as the checkpoint interval increases. In contrast, Arunagiri’s model
tracks the simulated number of I/O operations very well even for the larger checkpoint
intervals.
Figure 4.10 provides a comparison between the results generated by simulations with
the MTTI defined by an analysis of all of LANL system 19’s failure data (i.e., an MTTI
of 472 days) and those with the MTTI defined by an analysis of just the first two years of
system 19’s failure data (410 days). Using the former, the percentage error of the predicted
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Figure 4.9: Simulation of RAxML-Light with Node MTTI of 472 and 410 Days on System
19: Number of Checkpoint I/O Operations vs. Checkpoint Interval

Figure 4.10: Simulation of RAxML-Light with Node MTTI of 472 and 410 Days: Comparison of Execution Times and Number of Checkpoint I/O Operations
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execution time is less than 1%, while using the latter; it is less than 2%. In terms of number
of checkpoint I/O operations, using the former results in a percentage error of less than
7% and using the former, it is less than 10%. Thus, estimates of wall-clock execution time
and the number of checkpoint I/O operations obtained using the analytical models and a
value of MTTI computed using failure data from the first two years of production of the
system had an error of less than 10% for this system.

58

Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
Using application runs on a real HPC system and simulations, we showed that for RAxML
a popular community code, and workload of 17,000 gene sequences of length 1303 genetic
characters, increasing the checkpoint interval to a value that is larger than the optimal
checkpoint interval with respect to execution time results in a significant decrease in the
number of checkpoint I/O operations without a significant increase in execution time. This
shows that the analytical model with respect to checkpoint I/O operations holds good in
the studied cases. Our study also shows that for both exponential failure distributions
and historic failure data that do not fit an exponential distribution, the analytical model
related to checkpoint I/O operations [12] and execution time [21] results in predictions with
a maximum error of 10% and 2%, respectively.
Although our study with respect to execution time on Ranger did not yield any conclusive results, the experiments related validating the analytical model for number of checkpoint I/O operations gave positive results with percentage error ranging between 6% and
15%. The runs of RAxML on Ranger also provided the latency parameters of executing
RAxML-Light on 100 nodes (1,600 processors). And the failure data for LANL systems
18 and 19 in the CFDR provided an estimate of Node MTTI. In the future we plan to
explore the possibility of coordinating the I/O traffic of multiple concurrently executing
HPC applications to increase overall HPC system efficiency.
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Appendix A
Code Modifications
A.1

RAxML-Light Modified Code

#i f d e f DOEPROJ
s t a t i c int f a i l u r e A r r [MAXVAL] ;
s t a t i c double i n i t i a l T i m e ;
s t a t i c double n e x t f a i l u r e t i m e ;
s t a t i c double c n t f a i l u r e s ;
s t a t i c int i n i t i a l =0;
void i n v o k e C h e c k p o i n t ( t r e e ∗ t r ){
c h e c k P o i n t S t a t e ckp1 ;
double d e l t a , t = g e t t i m e ( ) , s t a r t =0, end =0;
char r e s t a r t F i l e [ 2 0 4 8 ] , buf [ 6 4 ] ;
int data , w, i =0;
FILE∗ m t t i F i l e ;
FILE ∗ f ;
i f ( i n i t i a l ==0){
//Comment : Reading F a i l u r e f i l e f i r s t time .
initialTime = t ;
m t t i F i l e=f o p e n ( m t t i f i l e n a m e , ‘ ‘ r ’ ’ ) ;
i f ( m t t i F i l e !=0)
{
while ( ( data = f s c a n f ( m t t i F i l e , ‘ ‘ % d ’ ’ , &w) ) != EOF)
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{
i f ( data ){
f a i l u r e A r r [ i ]=w;
i ++;
}
}
n e x t f a i l u r e t i m e =(double ) f a i l u r e A r r [ 0 ] ;
c n t f a i l u r e s=i ;
fclose ( mttiFile );
}
i n i t i a l = 1;
c h e c k p o i n t s i z e =0;
}
//Comment : This i s t h e l a t e s t c h e c k p o i n t f i l e t o be used f o r r e s t a r t .
strcpy ( restartFile ,

binaryCheckpointName ) ;

strcat ( restartFile , ‘ ‘ ’ ’ );
s p r i n t f ( buf ,

‘ ‘%d ’ ’ , ckpCount ) ;

s t r c a t ( r e s t a r t F i l e , buf ) ;
//Comment : Time f o r f a i l u r e t o occur
i f ( ( i n i t i a l < c n t f a i l u r e s ) &&
(( delta = ( t − initialTime )) > nextfailuretime ))
{
i f ( chkFlag==1){
r e s t a r t s i z e =0;
s t r c p y ( binaryCheckpointInputName , r e s t a r t F i l e ) ;
s t a r t=g e t t i m e ( ) ;
simRestart ( tr , i n i t a d e f ) ;
end=g e t t i m e ( ) ;
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logTime ( ‘ ‘ R e s t a r t S t a r t Time = ’ ’ + s t a r t + ‘ ‘ , ’ ’
+ ‘ ‘ End Time = ’ ’ + end +

‘‘, ’’

+ ‘ ‘ Duration = ’ ’ + ( end−s t a r t ) + ‘ ‘ , ’ ’
+ ‘ ‘ S i z e o f data w r i t e = ’ ’+ r e s t a r t s i z e + ‘ ‘( Bytes ) ’ ’ ) ;

} else {
p r i n t f ( ‘ ‘ I n f o : No r e s t a r t F i l e s t a r t from b e g i n n i n g . . . . \ n ’ ’ ) ;
}
i n i t i a l ++;
n e x t f a i l u r e t i m e = f a i l u r e A r r [ i n i t i a l −1];
}
else

i f ( ( d e l t a = ( t − lastCheckpointTime ) ) > c h e c k p o i n t I n t e r v a l )

{
//Comment : Writing C h e c k p o i n t a f t e r c h e c k p o i n t i n t e r v a l
lastCheckpointTime = t ;
s t a r t=g e t t i m e ( ) ;
//Comment : t r C k p S t a t e −−> Saved a f t e r c o m p l e t i o n o f SPR c y c l e
writeCheckpoint ( trCkpState ) ;
end=g e t t i m e ( ) ;
logTime ( ’ ’ Checkpoint S t a r t Time = ’ ’ + s t a r t + ‘ ‘ , ’ ’
+ ‘ ‘ End Time = ’ ’ + end +

‘‘, ’’

+ ‘ ‘ Duration = ’ ’ + ( end−s t a r t ) + ‘ ‘ , ’ ’
+ ‘ ‘ S i z e o f data w r i t e = ’ ’+
c h e c k p o i n t s i z e =0;
}
}
#endif
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c h e c k p o i n t s i z e + ‘ ‘( Bytes ) ’ ’ ) ;

A.2

Code for Curve Fitting

library ( f i t d i s t r p l u s )

##Change system as per r e q u i r e m e n t
system=2
d a t a F i l e <− read . csv ( ‘ ‘ data . csv ’ ’ , head=TRUE, sep = ‘ ‘ , ’ ’ ) ;
n e w F i l e <− na . omit ( d a t a F i l e ) # i g n o r e NA v a l u e s
f i l t e r F i l e <− subset ( newFile , n e w F i l e $system==i )
# change h e r e t o s e l e c t any o t h e r column
Y <− c ( f i l t e r F i l e $ l a s t . f a i l u r e )
f c o u n t <− length (Y)

##F i t W e i b u l l
M <− f i t d i s t (Y, ‘ ‘ w e i b u l l ’ ’ )
print (M)
plot (M)
g o f s t a t (M, print . t e s t = ‘ ‘TRUE ’ ’ )

##F i t E x p o n e n t i a l
M1 <− f i t d i s t (Y, ‘ ‘ exp ’ ’ )
print (M1)
plot (M1)
g o f s t a t (M1, print . t e s t = ‘ ‘TRUE ’ ’ )
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